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Plain-English Drafting For the “Age of Statutes”
by Douglas E. Abrams *
A generation ago, Professor Guido Calabresi chronicled the “statutorification” of American
law.   Within a few decades, he explained, the nation had moved “from a legal system dominated1
by the common law to one in which statutes, enacted by legislatures, have become the primary
source of law.”   2
A quick visit to a law library confirms the dominance of legislation today. Annual
compilations of the United States Statutes at Large and the Laws of Missouri now dwarf their slim
counterparts for any nineteenth-century year, and the United States Code and the Missouri Revised
Statutes now consume entire shelves. The volumes’ hefty indices underscore the sheer breadth of
subjects that federal and state legislation address, a spectrum wider today than ever before. Adding
to this heft are the codes, charters and ordinances enacted by city councils, boards of supervisors or
commissioners, and similar local legislative bodies from coast to coast.
We live (as Calabresi put it) in the “Age of Statutes,” when legislative drafting intimately
affects our public and private lives.   Because citizens with law degrees hold no monopoly on the3
statute books in our nation based on consent of the governed, lawmakers should strive to express
themselves in Plain English from initial drafting through enactment. The British and Scottish Law
Commissions state the core aspiration: “[A] statute should be drafted so that it ‘can be understood
as readily as its subject matter allows, by all affected by it.’”  4
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“BABY TALK”?
Some critics scoff at calls to draft legislation in Plain English. The gist of the critique is that
statutes speak not to lay readers, but to lawyers and judges whose law school training equips them
to grasp legal nuance and technicality.   “The language of our legislation,” says one critic, “cannot5
be reduced to baby talk for consumption by the masses.”6
I recognize that statutes make bad bedtime reading and do not deliver the sort of
entertainment we normally expect from the books and articles we choose to read. I recognize too that
intricate legal doctrine sometimes resists expression in Plain English. Tradition may also thwart
Plain English when a bill amends isolated sections of opaque chapters whose language and judicial
interpretations tie the hands of drafters who would opt for greater simplicity if they were starting
fresh.
Despite these roadblocks sometimes posed by intricacy or tradition, critics who denigrate the
general role of Plain English in legislative drafting belittle a core purpose of statutes in our
representative democracy: By making laws more comprehensible, Plain English helps law-abiding
people play by the rules.
The Missouri General Assembly’s Joint Committee on Legislative Research has it right: “The
essentials of good bill drafting are accuracy, brevity, clarity, and simplicity.”  These essentials7
acknowledge that legislative drafters, like other writers, do not speak in isolation; they speak to an
audience. A statute’s audience typically includes both lawyers and non-lawyers, and the second
group sometimes outnumbers the first. Plain English enhances clarity and understanding for both
groups. 
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THE LEGISLATURE’S AUDIENCE OF LAWYERS
Legislative drafters write for judges who interpret statutes, lawyers who counsel and advocate
their clients’ causes, public sector lawyers who administer the laws, and lawyers who are regulated
in their businesses or other affairs. Lawmakers advance the sound administration of justice when,
to the extent possible, they enact standards comprehensible to this diverse legally trained audience.
Some imprecision is inescapable in the legislative process, and some may even be deliberate.
“Anything that is written may present a problem of meaning,” Justice Felix Frankfurter observed,
because words “seldom attain[] more than approximate precision.”  But there is more. Even a bill8
drafted with reasonable clarity may be cobbled by many hands during the give-and-take of committee
hearings and floor debate along the tortuous path to enactment. Reflecting on his eight years in
Congress, Judge Abner J. Mikva explained that “it is not easy to get 535 prima donnas to agree on
anything. To get two separate majorities to agree separately on a single set of words to convey a clear
and complete idea – and then to get the President to sign such a miracle – is not easy.”9
To compound this inherent potential for imprecision, legislative sponsors striving to preserve
fragile coalitions for a controversial bill sometimes resort to what Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.
called “studied ambiguity,” ill-defined standards “deliberately adopted to let the courts put a gloss
on the words that the legislators could not agree upon.”  (In football, such deliberate action is called10
punting, and it is designed to produce strategic advantage.) Lawmakers can equivocate or
compromise, but the rules of jurisdiction normally require courts to decide cases, even when decision
turns on a statute whose language appears puzzling or incomplete.
Throughout the legislative process, fidelity to Plain English increases the likelihood of
statutory interpretation true to the majority enactors’ intent. “[P]lain language is more precise” than
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its alternatives “because it uncovers the ambiguities and errors that traditional style, with all its
excesses, tends to hide” until it is too late.  Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg says that statutory11
interpretation frequently divides an appellate court when “murky” legislation obscures rather than
clarifies meaning.  The Ginsburg critique reminds us that obscurity is obscurity, even when the12
reader displays a law degree or judicial commission on the office wall.
THE LEGISLATURE’S AUDIENCE OF NON-LAWYERS   
The legislative drafter’s lay audience begins with sponsors and other lawmakers themselves,
many or most of whom in a typical Congress or state or local legislature are not lawyers. Legislators
may debate and then vote based on understanding gleaned from staff members’ written summaries,
but reliance on these secondary sources brings risk when the bill and not the summary becomes law.
Following enactment, a statute’s application and enforcement may depend on decisionmaking
by public officials who have no formal legal training or sustained access to a legal staff.  Business
people and other non-lawyer professionals also frequently consult statutes that regulate their affairs.
The legislative drafter’s lay audience typically extends even further, however, to people from
all walks of life whom the enactment may affect, a class that may number in the thousands or more.
Congress and the Missouri General Assembly recognize this extended audience by posting filed bills,
and the United States Code and Missouri Revised Statutes themselves, on their official websites for
downloading and inspection by the general public.  City councils and local boards of supervisors13
or commissioners also typically post their charters, codes and ordinances.
Dean Roger C. Cramton is right that “[s]impler statutes and regulations written in ‘plain
English’ might be more readily followed without resort to professional advice.”   As I spend time14
in the University of Missouri School of Law library down the hall from my office, I often see the
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staff assisting members of the general public who wish to examine the statute books, as the general
public has every right to do.  Law and lawyers are expensive, most people seek to avoid litigation,
and self-representation remains a right in most circumstances.
In some fields of law, people often cannot afford professional advice, or may feel more
comfortable with self-representation.  I teach in one such field, family law. According to surveys in
some jurisdictions, at least one spouse litigates without a lawyer in more than half of divorce cases,
often because the spouse finds representation too costly or intrusive.  The divorce act, a statement15
of public values sculpted by elected representatives over time, should remain at least as accessible
as commercial “do it yourself” books sold in local discount stores.
Lay readers may learn about statutory law from summaries of particular fields written (in
Plain English, by the way) by a federal or state agency or a bar association. These summaries may
be requested by telephone or mail, and they typically appear on the Internet, supplemented by
answers to FAQs (frequently asked questions).  The Missouri Bar, for example, maintains an array16
of publications to help the general public understand the legal system, including more than fifty
brochures explaining individual legal topics.  17
Some fields of law, such as the federal antitrust laws and much state legislation implementing
complex federal mandates, have become so intricate that these unofficial Plain English summaries
may provide the lay public’s most realistic opportunity for understanding without counsel.  Agency18
or bar association publications, however, should complement rather than supplant the legislature’s
own efforts to demystify the law.
THE “LEGISLATIVE DRAFTER’S PRESUMPTION”
Legislative drafters should begin writing from the presumption that Plain English would
6
enable lay persons potentially affected by the bill to grasp its meaning.  The presumption favoring
Plain English remains rebuttable, but only for strong reasons because (as the Uniform Law
Conference of Canada recommends) “[a]n Act should be written as much as possible in ordinary
language, using technical terminology only if precision requires it.”  19
This Legislative Drafter’s Presumption is a logical corollary of a presumption already well-
established: “Persons are conclusively presumed to know the law,” and thus may not plead lack of
knowledge when they deal with the government or defend a civil or criminal proceeding.20
Conclusiveness actually makes the latter “presumption” a rule of law, commonly expressed as
“ignorance of the law is no excuse.”  For the rule to approach reality rather than survive merely as
a legal fiction, lawmakers should give lay people – that is, most people – a fair chance to understand
the legislation that the legal system conclusively presumes they understand.
  Understanding depends on access, which means more than simply the right to inspect bills
or statutes in a public law library or on an official website. Access also means making reasonable
efforts to enable citizens, to the extent possible, to read a bill or statute with some fair opportunity
to figure out generally what it says. 
Most citizens, of course, navigate legislative waters without benefit of a formal legal
education. But access grounded in Plain English enhances the capacity of lay readers to provide their
elected representatives commentary about bills, and then to conform their conduct to the statute or
decide whether to secure a lawyer’s professional assistance. That most people will not seek out these
opportunities does not diminish the entitlement of the people who do.  
 An Australian government minister, a strong proponent of Plain English  drafting, recently
acknowledged that when legislation concerns particularly complex legal doctrine, lawmakers
7
sometimes must strike “a delicate balance between . . . simplicity . . . and . . . comprehensive
coverage.”   The balance might tilt against Plain English in a particular case, but Professor David21
Mellinkoff provides a sound rationale for the Legislative Drafter’s Presumption favoring simplicity
in the absence of convincing rebuttal: “With communication the object, the principle of simplicity
would dictate that the language used by lawyers agree with the common speech, unless there are
reasons for a difference. . . . If there is no reason for departure from the language of common
understanding, the special usage is suspect.”22
CONCLUSION
Calls for Plain English drafting date at least from the late sixteenth century, when King
Edward VI urged Parliament to make statutes “more plain and short, to the intent that men might
better understand them.”   “[T]he first end of a writer,” English Poet Laureate and literary critic23
John Dryden counseled in 1700, is “to be understood.”  This first end is as central today as it was24
during the Age of Dryden three centuries ago. 
In most circumstances, “[t]he simplest English is the best for legislation.”  Plain English25
invigorates any writing.  Inside or outside the halls of the legislature, writers should strive for
nothing less. 
______________________________________________________________________________
* Douglas E. Abrams, a law professor at the University of Missouri, has written or co-authored five
books. Four U.S. Supreme Court decisions have cited his law review articles.
______________________________________________________________________________
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